Chip & SPin (The Times, today)

At 20:19:40 on 28/06/2006, Tumbleweed delighted uk.finance by announcing:

"Because the UK banks used the simpler and cheaper of two PIN encryption options, it is able to intercept and store the PIN and other details necessary to clone the card simply by listening to the conversation between the card and the reader. "

No, it's not.

--> ...*yet*. There doesn't need to be yet - it can be created from case histories over time.

"In reality, a fraud assessor at the bank will spend a few minutes sipping his coffee and pondering your case, and if he decides ..."

--> But it doesn't just depend on what *he* decides! - Just as much as it doesn't just depend on what the consumer decides.

"... not to reimburse you, then that's it."

--> Ermmm, not quite. You can take it to the Ombudsman. Or you can take it to the courts. Or both!

"They haven't broken the code of practice."

--> That's a matter of opinion - and it's not just one side's opinion (eg just the bank's) that matters.

"They don't need to prove to anyone, least of all you, what their standard of "reasonable" is."

--> Oh no? When the case goes to the Financial Ombudsman Service (FOS), is the bank not going to try to show their case? If they don't, the Ombudsman isn't very likely to find in their favour, are they?

"... there's no hard evidence either way, so there's not much you can do to change their minds."

--> That works both ways: 'there's no hard evidence either way, so there's not much **the bank** can do to change *your* mind.'