Talk of Britain's housing market being headed for stability and "past the worst" may yet prove dangerously complacent.

A thoughtful article..............

UK house price bubble has not burst but shifted

By Bill Jamieson

29 January 2006

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IF there is one certainty in economics, it is that the biggest problems can be made to disappear depending on the statistics used. We may now have reached that point in the UK housing market where the "problem" has been made to vanish. Has not even Roger Bootle, the last pessimistic housing bear, growled in retreat and thrown in the towel?

The consensus view is that a house price crash has been averted and that the Bank of England has achieved a "soft landing". The house price bust has not materialised. The threat is now seen to be behind us.

But might not the opposite be true? Far from the threat of a house price boom and bust having subsided, it remains one of the most potent reasons for the Bank's Monetary Policy Committee not to cut interest rates this spring. The bubble risk is not buried behind us. It is still very much "out in front".

How can this be when all the evidence shows house prices have slowed and are now growing at a more sustainable pace: no busts, crashes or slumps? According to the widely quoted Halifax, UK house prices rose by

2.1% in the final three months of 2005, giving a rate of increase over the year of 5.1%, the smallest annual rise for 10 years. It calculates the average UK house price at £171,632.

The Office of the Deputy Prime Minister says the annual rate of house price growth picked up slightly in November, to 2.5%, with the average home now costing £186,431. The Nationwide estimates the annual rate of house price growth last year at 3%, with the average cost of a house now £157,250 - unchanged from May. For reference, the Land Registry's average house price figure is now £194,589. Notwithstanding this divergence as to "average" prices and rates of increase, there is no doubting that the market has cooled sharply from the double-digit percentage rises recorded for 2003 and 2004.

The statistic most cited for the "no crash in sight" view is that for mortgage lending. Approvals for house purchases jumped by 51% in November on 12 months previously. The rise in seasonally adjusted mortgage lending was £5.1bn, up from £4.3bn in October and the biggest rise since July 2004. This rise continued into December, with gross lending up 25% to £26.3bn, the highest December figure since records began (1964). Gross lending for the whole of last year at £287.5bn was just 1% down on the record 2004 total.

QED, surely, for the "soft landing" school? Well, not quite. There are issues outstanding. The first is that, if this is the strength of mortgage demand before an expected series of further rate cuts, is it little wonder there is concern as to what might happen in the wake of actual cuts? The fear within the MPC is that further reductions would inflate a market that has not really lost its "bubble" characteristics, only this time around there may be no orderly means of retreat without risking a massive blow to confidence.

Another concern is the reliance on misleading statistical averages. No one lives in an "average" home. And the average figures happily quoted by the likes of the Halifax and the Nationwide obscure the reality of house price stagnation and falling prices in many regions of the UK. According to Hometrack, which monitors a broad total of 7,500 estate agents across the country, the average house price has already shown a 4.2% fall since the market peaked in the spring of 2004. Of 54 cities surveyed by Hometrack, 48 saw price falls in 2005, with reductions of up to 7% recorded.

Against this, Scotland is frequently cited as one area where the housing market is still resilient, with strong rises recorded last year. It is widely assumed that the house price to income ratio is lower (implying that price increases have still some way to go) and that the market is in a broadly healthy state.

But Scotland historically tends to lag the rest of the UK in house price movements. And the claims to a more "healthy" state of house price buoyancy relative to the rest of the UK may not be as solid as commonly thought. Last Friday, the Bank of Scotland revealed that the number of first-time buyers in Scotland had fallen to a record low. Five years ago the typical deposit was £4,992, equivalent to 23% of average earnings. Today the typical deposit is £15,762, equivalent to about 57% of average earnings. A typical first-time buyer is now unable to afford a semi-detached property in 81% of towns surveyed, compared with 9% in 2002.

Now this should worry the "no bubble" school. First, regions such as Scotland have long been cited as subdued or stable markets that help bear down on those more worrying "national averages". And second, without a stream of first-time buyers, the health of the overall market is in jeopardy. First-time buyers account for just 24% of the Scottish market, against 37% a decade ago. With the south-west of England, this is the smallest proportion of any part of the UK. Terraced properties are now unaffordable for Scottish buyers in 30% of towns, against 7% in

2002. For the record, Edinburgh is now the least unaffordable city in Scotland, with the average property price representing 7.7 times the average income of a first-time buyer. Add in the increase in unemployment and Scottish manufacturing in recession, and it is not hard to see a weak prop for arguments about the sustainability of national "average" house prices.

Now there is a respectable argument, and one few would challenge, that both in Britain and in some housing markets overseas, there has been (a scary phrase, this, for seasoned stock market investors) a "one-off paradigm shift", brought about by the widespread and prolonged falls in inflation and interest rates.

Lower nominal interest rates make possible a rise in debt-to-income ratios and thus increase the amount of money buyers can afford to pay. As a result, house price to income ratios have hit historic highs, Japan of course, being the exception, still recovering from a "lost decade" of price deflation. The argument, eloquently advanced in a paper this weekend by UBS analyst Larry Hatheway, is that there has not been a house price "bubble" in the commonly understood sense of a flight from rational pricing, but a structural change leading to a change in lending practices. More people can borrow. And people can borrow more.

This is fine up to a point. But one of the many issues begged is what constitutes the standardised average house price - see the range between £158,000 and £194,000 quoted earlier - and which measure of "average" income is used. As a result, as economist James Ferguson has astutely spotted, in Britain now the price-to-income ratio can range from 6.2 times to a high-wire 8.3 times, depending on which figures are used.

Put another way, with the "right" figures you can make this latent problem vanish, even though it still lurks in the system. Talk of Britain's housing market being headed for stability and "past the worst" may yet prove dangerously complacent.

Reply to
Crowley
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"Crowley" wrote

Why has the "typical deposit" grown faster than house prices?

If the "typical deposit" was always, say, 10% of purchase price then it would have grown at the same rate as house prices have over the past 5 years.

So - what proportion of house prices was the "typical deposit" 5 years ago, and what proportion is it now?

What are the *two* figures for "long-term average" P-I ratio, calculated using equivalent historic figures to those for the 6.2 & 8.3 above?

Reply to
Tim

Because first time buyers are richer, so can afford a bigger deposit (or they get more help from other sources...)

I think this is a problem with assuming that a "first time buyer" is the same thing. Or that all first time buyers actually "save for 5 years" or whatever silly statistic they think up.

Jim.

Reply to
Jim Ley

Elementary.

The above figures suggest that average earnings have risen by only 27.4% in the last five years. The unstated assumption is that house prices have risen faster than earnings, and because borrowing is generally capped at a multiple of earnings, then as more and more people are affected by the cap, bigger deposits are needed.

Reply to
Ronald Raygun

note...that to place a larger deposit you have to have the money to place that deposit...

money lenders have to lend money to make profits..... they will change their rules according to the amount of money they have on hand and need to lend....

the background system is at moral hazard, for the government will (almost) always bail out lender from taxes... therefore risk assessments will tend to be loose.

regards...

Reply to
abelard

If house prices rise faster than wage inflation, then we'd expect the size of the deposit to grow as a percentage of the purchase price. If a house is worth 110,000 and a person has a salary of 25,000, then 3x their salary is 75,000, requiring a 35,000 deposit. If the same house is now worth 180,000, and their salary has grown to 30,000, then 3x their salary is 90,000, requiring a 90,000 deposit. So house prices have increased by 64%, but since wages have only increased by 20%, the required deposit has risen by 257%.

Cheers,

Ross-c

Reply to
clemenr

I don't think we can read too much in to this. When FTB's buy new houses the builder will often, as an incentive, contribute to the deposit with slush fund money, obtained by putting the house on the market at a higher price than it would fetch on the market.

My son was offered £5k worth of free extras when he signed up for a new house, but the workmanship and standard of finish of these "extras" was dismal. They'll require replacement before he can move out and sell.

A relative in Glasgow tells me the local Estate Agents won't even accept commissions to sell recent new builds anywhere near the original price. typically they propose 10-15% less than the original cost.

DG

Reply to
Derek ^

keep in mind...sticking strictly to using your example the person above now has £90k equity in the original pile....

regards....

Reply to
abelard

I was talking about different FTBs at different times in the price cycle.

Cheers,

Ross-c

Reply to
clemenr

i expected that... but a large proportion of buyers will not be ftb.... many will eg be divorcees with split equity....

that means two units and greater pressure on the supply...

what matter to the lenders is getting customers who can pay....

regards...

Reply to
abelard

Unless they rent, go home to mummy, or move in with the boyfriend/girlfriend

....you don't say ? :-0

Reply to
Crowley

possibly because of what I posted a few days ago, many more couples breaking up and buying two (smaller) houses, using the equity from the bigger home they are selling. Plus they are older and have more money than an 'FTBer'.

Reply to
Tumbleweed

and a proportion will do one of those, but *as a whole* from 2 people in 1 house, you are going to end up with 2 people in 1.x houses. Hence, more pressure on house prices, mostly at the lower end of the market. Whilst at the higher end, less pressure. Is this what the figures reflect?

Reply to
Tumbleweed

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